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Maransky: Issue Preclusion - Assessing the Issue Preclusive Effect of State

1994]
ISSUE PRECLUSION-AsEsSING THE ISSUE PRECLUSWVE EFFECT OF STATE
AGENCY DECISIONS IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT

I. INTRODUCTION
Congress' scheme for enforcing many of the federal anti-discrimination laws requires significant coordination with the state administrative
agencies charged with preventing discrimination at the state and local
levels.' Specifically, many of the federal anti-discrimination statutes prohibit individuals from requesting relief from federal agencies until after
state agencies have had an opportunity to resolve the complaint.2 Moreover, the interaction of state and federal law may require more than one
state agency to resolve factual disputes. For example, in the employment
context, the same allegedly discriminatory conduct may give rise to claims
for pecuniary relief under a state's unemployment compensation law and
under a federal anti-discrimination statute.3 When federal litigation com1. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1988) (setting forth enforcement provisions of
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and providing that if alleged unlawful practice occurs in state that prohibits discrimination in employment because of age, no suit may be brought under ADEA until earlier of 60 days after
proceedings have been commenced under state law or until such state law proceedings have been terminated); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1988) (setting forth enforcement provisions of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Tide VII) and
providing that if alleged unlawful employment practice occurs in state that prohibits unlawful employment practice alleged, no charge may be filed under Tide VII
until earlier of 60 days after proceedings have been commenced under state law or
until state law proceedings have been terminated); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (Supp. V
1993) (setting forth enforcement provisions of Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA) and incorporating Tide VII enforcement provisions by reference). See generally STEPHEN N. SHULMAN & CHARLEs F. ABERNATHY, THE LAW OF EQUAL OPPORTUNIT'

EMPLOYMENT

7.02(1) (1990) (describing interaction of Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission and analogous state agencies in litigation under Tide VII
of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
2. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 633(b). The ADEA, in pertinent part, reads:
In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State which has
a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age .... no
suit may be brought under section 626 of this tide before the expiration
of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State
law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated ....
Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). Tide VII, in pertinent part, reads:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a
State... which has a... law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged ....

no charge may be filed under subsection (a) of this

section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after
proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless
such proceedings have been earlier terminated ....
Id. (footnote omitted); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (incorporating Tide VII enforcement
provisions by reference).
3. See, e.g., 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 821(a) (1991) (Pennsylvania's Unemployment Compensation Statute). Under this statute, for example, an individual
who leaves work in Pennsylvania to avoid discrimination or harassment would file a

(1079)
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mences after state agency proceedings have been completed, debate exists
about whether the factual findings of the state agency, or agencies, have
issue preclusive effect in the subsequent lawsuit based on the federal
4
statute.
This Comment discusses the approach taken by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in determining whether or not to
afford issue preclusive effect to state administrative agency findings in sub5
sequent lawsuits alleging discrimination in violation of a federal statute.
Section II of this Comment discusses collateral estoppel and res judicata
and provides an overview of state administrative proceedings. 6 Section II
continues to examine the framework developed by the United States
claim for compensation with the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review. Id. In addition, the individual likely will want to seek relief
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
Title VII creates a cause of action for those individuals who believe that their employer has discriminated against them. See id. ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to... refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... ).
In a typical case in which an individual believes that he or she has been subjected to discrimination in the workplace, the individual commences a Title VII
lawsuit by contacting the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),

the federal agency empowered to prevent unlawful employment

ractices. Id.

§ 2000e-5 (a). However, before permitting the complainant to file a formal charge

with the EEOC, Title VII requires that the EEOC first determine whether the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred in a state, or political subdivision of
a state, which has a state or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice. Id. § 2000e-5(c). If such a state or local law exists, Title VII requires that the
EEOC prohibit the complainant from filing a charge under Title VII until the
expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under that law.
Id.
Because of this dual enforcement strategy, findings concerning the existence
or non-existence of discriminatory conduct likely will be made by state and federal
factfinders. Under Pennsylvania law, a complainant who wants to proceed under
Title VII must begin by asking the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission to
find facts concerning the existence or non-existence of discriminatory conduct.
See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 959(a) (Supp. 1993) (charging Pennsylvania Human
Relations Commission with task of investigating and resolving claims of discrimination within Pennsylvania).
4. See, e.g., Charles C.Jackson et al., The ProperRole of ResJudicataand Collateral
Estoppel in Title WI Suits, 79 Mici. L. REv. 1485, 1489 (1981) (proposing "general
guidelines for application of preclusion doctrines in Title VII litigation" and arguing that "doctrines of resjudicata and collateral estoppel should preclude relitigation of claim and issues that were or could have been fully and fairly litigated in a
state proceeding" only when that state's fair employment practices laws parallel
Title VII); Marjorie A. Silver, In Lieu of Preclusion: Reconciling-AdministrativeDecisionmaking and Federal Civil Rights Claims, 65 IND. LJ. 367, 369 (1990) (arguing that
United States Supreme Court's expansive view of preclusion doctrine "has frustrated the substantive purpose of federal civil rights laws").
5. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's approach to determining the preclusive effect of state agency decisions in later lawsuits based on the federal anti-discrimination statutes, see infra notes 50-80 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of the concepts of collateral estoppel and resjudicata and
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Supreme Court for analyzing this issue and shows how the Third Circuit
has used this framework in cases involving factual determinations made by
the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (the
Board) concerning the existence of discriminatory conduct. 7 Section III
of this Comment discusses the important factors involved in determining
the issue preclusive effect of state agency decisions in subsequent lawsuits
based on federal anti-discrimination statutes and reviews the role of the
state law of collateral estoppel in the Third Circuit's decisional framework. 8 In addition, this section summarizes the present state of the law in
the Third Circuit with respect to each of the federal anti-discrimination
statutes. 9 Finally, Section IV concludes that the Third Circuit's approach
to this issue has been consistent with the guidelines set forth by the United
States Supreme Court and the policies that underlie collateral estoppel. 10

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

DistinguishingBetween CollateralEstoppel and Res judicata

Although courts and practitioners often use the terms interchangeably, res judicata differs from collateral estoppel. 1I Properly, res judicata is
12
used to refer to the preclusive effect on the claim or cause of action. '
The general rule of claim preclusion is "that a party ordinarily may not
assert a civil claim arising from a transaction with respect to which he has
prosecuted such a claim, whether or not the two claims wholly correspond
an overview of the administrative proceedings of a typical state agency, see infra
notes 11-26 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the framework provided by the United States Supreme
Court for use in evaluating the issue preclusive effect of state agency decisions in
subsequent lawsuits based on the federal anti-discrimination statutes and Third
Circuit decisions made in light of this framework, see infra notes 27-80 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the factors that a practitioner should review in analyzing
the preclusive effect of state agency findings in subsequent lawsuits based on the
federal anti-discrimination statutes, see infra notes 81-112 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the role of the state law of collateral estoppel in the Third
Circuit's decisional framework, see infra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the current state of the law in the Third Circuit concerning this issue with respect to each of the federal anti-discrimination statutes,
see infra notes 113-46 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the appropriateness of the Third Circuit's approach to
this issue in light of the role of state administrative decisionmakers in the enforcement of federal anti-discrimination efforts and the policies underlying collateral
estoppel, see infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 4 (1982) (noting, in introduction to Restatement, liberality in use of term res judicata); see also Tonka Corp. v.
Rose Art Indus., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 200, 210 (D.N.J. 1993) ("The term resjudicata
has been given a variety of meanings, some of which incorporate the distinct concept of collateral estoppel."). This Comment addresses only the issue of preclusive
effect (collateral estoppel) of state agency decisions; it does not discuss claim preclusion (res judicata).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 4.
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13
to each other."
In contrast, the rule of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, is "that a party ordinarily may not relitigate an issue that he [or
she] fully and fairly litigated on a previous occasion."1 4 More specifically,
the general rule of issue preclusion is that "[w] hen an issue of fact or law is
actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the
determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a
different claim." 15

B.

Overview of State Administrative Proceedings: The Original
Decision Makers

Proceedings by most state administrative agencies that have judicialtype authority are substantially similar.16 Generally, a complainant brings
a claim or a charge against an individual or entity and before a bureau or
board of the state agency. The bureau or board then finds facts and ap17
plies the law to these facts to reach a decision.
Proceedings under Pennsylvania's Unemployment Compensation
Law provide an excellent example of the operation of state agency proceedings. Under Pennsylvania law, the Department of Labor and Industry
(the Department) is the state agency charged with administering Pennsylvania's Unemployment Compensation Law. 18 Pennsylvania's law and
regulatory code permit an individual who leaves work because of discrimination by an employer or co-worker to initiate a claim for unemployment
compensation by applying for benefits with the Bureau of Employment
Security of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the Bureau), the state
agency charged with initially determining the validity of unemployment
compensation claims. 1 9
13. Id. at 1; see also id. §§ 18-26 (discussing effects of personal judgments on
original claim, counterclaim and scope of claim).
14. Id. at 1. See generally Austin W. Scott, Collateral Estoppel By Judgment, 56

I-Iv. L. REv. 1 (1942) (providing excellent discussion of theoretical underpinnings of doctrine of collateral estoppel, authored by reporter for Restatement of
Judgments).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27. -Comment (c) to § 27 of the
Restatement ofJudgments points out that the most difficult aspect of applying § 27
will be determining whether the issue in the first action is the same issue litigated
in the second action. Id. § 27, at cmt. c.
16. SeeALFPRD C. AMAN,J. & WLiAM T. MAYrON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 120
(1993) (stating that "agencies typically determine, by finding facts and interpreting
statutes and other sources of law, whether conduct by individuals conforms to laws
that agencies implement").
17. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw § 1.6, at 12-13 (3d ed. 1991)
(using NewJersey Workmen's Compensation Division and Federal Trade Commission to describe duties of typical state and federal agencies).
18. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761(a) (1992).
19. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 821(a) (1991). In pertinent part, § 821 states
that the Department of Labor and Industry of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
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Under Pennsylvania law, the Bureau must deny benefits to applicants
who allege discrimination if, after investigating the claim, the Bureau determines that there was no discrimination, and therefore, the applicant
left work voluntarily without the statutorily required cause of a necessitous
and compelling nature. 20 If the Bureau denies the applicant's claim, the
applicant may appeal.2 1 A Department appointed referee hears the appeal, which gives the applicant an opportunity to tell his or her story in a
quasi-judicial setting. 22 If the referee renders a decision adverse to the
(the Department) "shall promptly examine each application for benefits and on

the basis of the facts found by it shall determine whether or not the application is
valid." Id. In practice, the Department has delegated this task of initially determining the validity of a claim to the Bureau of Employment Security of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (the Bureau). See 34 PA. CODE § 65.61 (1990) (stating
that Bureau issues decisions invalidating claims but not until claimant has chance
to refute alleged facts); see also id. at §§ 65.22-.63 (describing application procedure for benefits under Pennsylvania's Unemployment Compensation Law); Maurice Abrams, The Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review-Scope of
its Functions and Responsibilities, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 436, 436-42 (1963) (describing
claims procedures under Pennsylvania's Unemployment Compensation Law).
20. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 802(b) (1991). Section 802 sets forth a number

of grounds upon which the Bureau may justify determining that an applicant is
ineligible for unemployment compensation. Id. § 802. Section 802(b) states that
an "employee shall be ineligible for compensation .. ,. [if] his [or her] unemploy-

ment is due to voluntarily leaving work without cause of a necessitous and compelling
nature." Id. § 802(b) (emphasis added). Pennsylvania state courts have held that
leaving a job because of discrimination satisfies the necessitous and compelling

requirement of § 802(b). See, e.g., Taylor v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of
Review, 378 A.2d 829, 834 (Pa. 1977) (holding that racial discrimination satisfied
cause of necessitous and compelling nature requirement); MacGregor v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 415 A.2d 141, 142 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1980) (proving charge of age discrimination would constitute cause
of necessitous and compelling nature); Pianelli v. Unemployment Compensation
Bd. of Review, 368 A.2d 1339, 1341 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977) (holding that failure to
pay employee equal compensation for equal work on basis of gender constitutes
cause of necessitous and compelling nature).
21. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 821(e) (1991); see, e.g., Roth v. Koppers Indus.,
Inc., 993 F.2d 1058, 1059 (3d Cir. 1993) (former employee appealing adverse decision by Bureau concerning cause of employee's termination); Kelley v. TYK
Refractories, Co., 860 F.2d 1188, 1190 (3d Cir. 1988) (former employee appealing
adverse decision by Bureau concerning cause of employee's termination). In addition to the applicant's appeal, the claimant's last employer would also appeal an
adverse decision by the Bureau in order to prevent the-Department from charging
the employer's reserve account with a portion of the state's cost of funding the
claimant's unemployment. See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 782(a) (1) (setting forth

procedures for establishing and maintaining employer's reserve accounts); see also
Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186, 190 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining why employers have financial interest in outcome of unemployment compensation cases brought by their employees).
22. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 822 (1991). Under Pennsylvania law, the referee may examine the parties and their witnesses. 34 PA. CODE § 101.21(a) (1988).
In addition, when a party proceeds pro se, the referee must advise the party of his

or her rights and aid him or her in cross-examining witnesses. Id. Moreover, the
parties generally have an opportunity to present "the evidence and testimony
which they believe is necessary to establish their rights." Id. § 101.21(b).
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applicant, the applicant may make a final administrative appeal to the
Board. 25 If the Board also rules against the applicant, the applicant's only
recourse is to appeal the Board's decision to the Commonwealth Court of
24
Pennsylvania.
In Pennsylvania, a claimant's right to judicial review does not attach
until after the claimant has exhausted all potential administrative remedies.2 5 Moreover, even when a court hears an appeal, in certain circumstances, the court's determination may have issue preclusive effect in
subsequent lawsuits, thereby eliminating the claimant's hope for relief in a
subsequent lawsuit based on a federal anti-discrimination statute. 26 Because of this possibility, practitioners should proceed cautiously when deciding whether or not to seek judicial review of agency decisions.
C.
1.

Preclusive Effect of State Agency Findings in Subsequent Lawsuits

United States Supreme Court Decisions: A Frameworkfor Analysis

The United States Supreme Court, in Kremer v. Chemical Construction
Corp.2 7 and University of Tennessee v. Elliott,28 established certain parameters
for issue preclusion in the federal courts. 29 In Kremer, the Court held that
23. See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 822 (stating that referee's decision shall be
final decision of Board unless either party files appeal); Id. § 832 ("Upon the final
determination of any appeal, the board shall enter an order in accordance with
the decree of the court.").
24. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5105(a)(2) (1981). Section 5105(a) (2) provides that "[t]here is a right of appeal ... from the final order ... of every...
[g]overnment unit which is an administrative agency... to the court having juris-

diction of such appeals." Id. In Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth Court has exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of the Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review. Id. at § 763 (a) (1).
25. Killian v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
405 A.2d 1372, 1374 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979). In Killian, the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review moved to quash the claimant's petition for review on
the grounds that the claimant had failed to first exhaust his administrative remedies. Id.
26. In analyzing questions of whether to afford collateral estoppel effect to
the findings of the Board, the Third Circuit has clearly stated that it finds two
factors of paramount concern. First, the court considers the level of state court
review received by the agency's findings. See Roth v. Koppers Indus.,,Inc., 993 F.2d
1058, 1061-63 (3d Cir. 1993) (deciding case on ground that state court never reviewed Board's finding). Second, the court requires that the state law requirements of collateral estoppel must be satisfied for the issue in question. See Kelley v.
TYK Refractories, Co., 860 F.2d 1188, 1194 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that finding of
Board, which was affirmed by state court, had no preclusive effect in subsequent
Title VII lawsuit because state law elements of collateral estoppel were not satisfied). For a complete discussion of the Third Circuit's decisions in Roth and Keley,
see infra notes 50-80 and accompanying text.
27. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Co., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
28. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
29. See Elliot 478 U.S. at 795-97 (establishing that federal courts must not

afford issue preclusive effect to findings of state agency in subsequent lawsuit based
on Title VII if state court has not reviewed state agency's findings); Kremer, 456 U.S.
at 485 (establishing that federal courts must afford issue preclusive effect to find-
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in a subsequent lawsuit based on violations of Title VIIof the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Tide VII) 30 a federal court must afford issue preclusive effect
to the findings of a state agency if a state court has reviewed those findings.3 ' The plaintiff employee in Kremer brought a Title VII employment
discrimination lawsuit against the defendant employer after a New York
court affirmed a state agency's finding that the employer did not discriminate against the employee on the basis of age.32 In the majority opinion,
Justice White held that 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (§ 1738), which requires federal
courts to "give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that
those judgments would be given in the courts of the State from which the
judgments emerged,"3 3 applies to proceedings under Title VII.M Specifiings of state agency in subsequent lawsuit based on Tide VII if state court reviewed
state agency's findings).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
31. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 485. The Court, in Kremer, stated:
[T] he usual rule is that merits of a legal claim once decided in a court of
competent jurisdiction are not subject to redetermination in another forum. Such a fundamental departure from traditional rules of preclusion
... can be justified only if plainly stated by Congress. Because there is no
"affirmative showing" of a "clear and manifest" legislative purpose in Title
VII to deny... collateral estoppel effect to a state courtjudgment... the
judgment of the Court of Appeals is Affirmed,
Id.

32. Id. at 464-65. The plaintiff employee, Kremer, initially filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC. Id. at 463. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c), which
states that the EEOC must give state agencies the initial opportunity to resolve
discrimination complaints, the EEOC referred Kremer's charge to the New York
State Division of Human Rights (NYDHR), the state agency charged with enforcing New York's law prohibiting employment discrimination. Id. at 463-64.
NYDHR, after investigating the complaint, concluded that there was no probable
cause to believe that the employer engaged in the alleged discriminatory conduct.
Id. at 464. The NYDHR appeal board subsequently upheld the determination. Id.
In response to the adverse decision by the state agency, Kremer again sought relief
from the EEOC and also appealed the agency's decision to the Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court, which upheld the agency's decision. Id.
33. Id. at 466; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988) ("Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within
the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in
the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken.").
34. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468. The Court noted that § 1738 applies "unless a
later statute contains an express or implied partial repeal" of the section. Id. (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 99 (1980)). After scrutinizing the text and legislative history of Title VII, the Court concluded that Title VII contained no such
express or partial repeal. Id. at 468-76. The Court reviewed the text of Title VII in
search of clues that could support a finding that Tide VII repealed § 1738. See id.
at 468 (stating that because there is no claim that Title VII expressly repealed
§ 1738, if any repeal exists it must be implied). Specifically, the Court looked to
see if the provisions of § 1738 and Title VII were in irreconcilable conflict or if
Title VII covered the whole subject of § 1738. Id. (citing Radzanower v. Touche
Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 154 (1976)).
The Court concluded that there was no irreconcilable conflict despite the argument that it is inconsistent to apply § 1738 to subsequent lawsuits based on Title
VII, given that Title VII requires a trial de novo in federal court after federal and
state agencies have considered a complaint. Id. at 468-70. The Court stated that
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cally, Justice White stated that in a subsequent lawsuit under Title VII,
§ 1738 applied in the absence of a "clear and manifest" legislative purpose
in Tide VII to afford preclusive effect to judgments from the courts of all
states.3 5 In contrast, in a footnote to the majority opinion, Justice White
asserted that unreviewed state agency determinations should not be precluded from review by federal courts, even if the courts of the state in
which the agency operates would afford preclusive effect to the state
36
agency's determinations.
In Elliot4 the Supreme Court elaborated on the issue raised by Justice
White's footnote to Kremer, holding that federal courts may sometimes afford preclusive effect to unreviewed state agency decisions. 3 7 In Elliott, the
plaintiff employee filed a lawsuit alleging violations of Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983) after a state administrative law judge (ALJ) found
that the defendant employer did not discriminate on the basis of race
when it fired the employee.3 8 In the lawsuit based on Title VII, the employer argued that the ALJ's finding that the employer did not engage in
discriminatory conduct prohibited relitigation of the same issue in federal
court.3 9 In response to the employer's argument, the Court referred to its
this requirement pertained only to the treatment that federal courts must give to

the decisions coming to them directly from administrative agencies. Id. at 469.
This requirement did not apply to final judgments of state courts. Id. at 469-70.

Similarly, the Court found that Title VII's requirement that the EEOC give "substantial weight" to findings made in state proceedings was a minimum requirement
which did not preclude the EEOC from giving greater weight (i.e., preclusive effect) to findings made in state proceedings when appropriate. Id.
35. Id. at 485. Specifically, the Court concluded that "[niothing in the legislative history of the... Act suggests that Congress considered it necessary or desirable to provide an absolute right to relitigate in federal court an issue resolved by a
state court." Id. at 473.
36. Id. at 470 n.7 ("[llt is clear that unreviewed administrative decisions by
state agencies also should not preclude such review even if such a decision were to
be afforded preclusive effect in a State's own courts.").
37. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794 (1986) ("28 U.S.C. § 1738
governs the preclusive effect to be given the judgments and records of state courts,
and is not applicable to the unreviewed state administrative factfinding at issue in
this case. However, we have frequently fashioned common-law rules of preclusion
in the absence of a governing statute.").
38. Id. at 790. In Elliott, the employee, Elliott, requested an administrative
hearing to contest his proposed termination after being informed that he would
be terminated for inadequate work performance and misconduct on the job. Id.
Before the hearing commenced, Elliott also filed suit in district court alleging that
his proposed termination was racially motivated. Id. In his suit in district court,
Elliott sought relief under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 790-91.
In the hearing before an administrative assistant to the University of Tennessee's Vice President for Agriculture, who presided as an Administrative LawJudge
(ALJ), the ALJ determined that the University had proven some, but not all of the
charges against Elliott. Id. at 791. The ALJ also found that the discharge was not
racially motivated. Id. Elliott appealed the ALJ's decision to the University of Tennessee's Vice President for Agriculture, who subsequently upheld the ALJ's decision. Id. at 791-92. Elliott did not petition Tennessee's state courts to review the
administrative proceedings. Id. at 792.
39. Id. The district court agreed with the University of Tennessee's argument
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exposition in prior cases on the language and legislative history of Title
VII to conclude that Congress did not intend for federal courts to grant
preclusive effect in subsequent lawsuits under Tide VII to unreviewed state
agency decisions.A
In addition to relying on the rationale that it had used previously, the
Elliott Court added an important analytical tool to the question of issue
preclusion by stating that courts can create a federal common law rule of
preclusion. 4 ' In explaining this rule, the Court stated that not only "is [it]
sound policy to apply principles of issue preclusion to the factfinding of
administrative bodies acting in ajudicial capacity," but federal courts must
grant an unreviewed state agency decision preclusive effect if a common
law rule of preclusion would be consistent with Congress' intent in enacting the particular statute at issue in the subsequent lawsuit. 42
The Elliott Court applied this federal common law rule of preclusion
in its analysis of the employee's claims under Tide VII and § 1983. 4 3 The
Court reviewed Tide VII's enforcement scheme and concluded that no
federal common law rule of preclusion existed for Title VII." In its analysis, the Court emphasized that Tide VII required the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), when investigating discrimination
charges, to give substantial weight to findings made by state authorities. 45
The Court reasoned that Congress would not have included such a provithat Elliott's lawsuit based on federal civil rights statutes was an improper collateral
attack on the ALJ's decision. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. Id.
40. Id. at 795-97. To support its findings concerning the language and the
legislative history of Title VII, the Court referred to its analysis in Kremer and its
opinion in Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976). Elliott, 478 U.S. at 795.
The Court stated that, in Chandler, it had held that "a federal employee whose
discrimination claim was rejected by her employing agency after an administrative
hearing was entitled to a trial de novo in federal court on her Title VII claim." Id.
Next, the Court noted that Elliott, like the employee in Chandler,pursued his Tide
VII claim directly following administrative proceedings and without first seeking
redress in state court. Id. at 796. Accordingly, the employee was entitled to a trial
de novo in federal court on his allegations that his employer discriminated against
him in violation of Tide VII. See id. at 799 (affirming portion ofjudgment of Court
of Appeals that denied preclusive effect to agency finding in subsequent Tide VII
lawsuit).
41. Id. at 796. The Court stated that § 1738 governs the preclusive effect of

the judgments and records of state courts, but "because § 1738 antedates the development of administrative agencies it clearly does not represent a congressional
determination that the decisions of state administrative agencies should not be
given preclusive effect." Id. at 794-95. Accordingly, the Court considered whether
a common law rule of preclusion was appropriate with respect to the respondents
claims under Title VII and § 1983. Id. at 795.
42. See id. at 796 (concluding that Sixth Circuit correctly determined that
Congress did not intend unreviewed state administrative proceedings to have
preclusive effect on subsequent claims based on Tide VII).
43. Id. at 795-99.
44. Id. at 795-96. The Court asserted that a federal common law rule of preclusion would be inconsistent with its analysis in Kremer and Chandler. Id. at 796.
45. Id. at 795; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988) ("In determining
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sion in the statute if Congress had intended unreviewed state agency findings to have preclusive effect in federal court. 46 Therefore, the Court held
that a federal common law of preclusion could not be fashioned for unre47
viewed state agency findings in subsequent lawsuits under Title VII.
Conversely, in analyzing § 1983, the Elliott Court found that the section's legislative history did "not in any clear way suggest that Congress
'48
intended to repeal or restrict the traditional doctrines of preclusion.
Therefore, the Court held that a federal common law of preclusion does
exist in relation to unreviewed state agency findings in subsequent lawsuits
arising under § 1983. 49 After comparing the Court's analysis of Title VII
and § 1983, it would seem that a presumption of a federal common law of
preclusion exists for unreviewed state agency decisions in subsequent litigation under a federal statute unless the express or implied terms of the
statute or its legislative history mandate a contrary result.
2.

The Application of Kremer and Elliott by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has ad50
dressed the issue preclusive effect of state agency findings several times.
Generally, these cases have involved fact patterns directly analogous
to those in Kremer and Elliott, and the Third Circuit has reached conclusions that are consistent with the rules of law set forth by the United States Supreme Court.5 1 However, the Third Circuit has not yet
needed to employ the federal common law of preclusion analysis of
whether reasonable cause exists, the Commission shall accord substantial weight to
final findings and orders made by State or local authorities .... ).
46. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 795 ("[I] t would make little sense for Congress to write
such a provision if state agency findings were entitled to preclusive effect in Title
VII actions in federal court.").
47. Id. at 796 ("We conclude that

....

Congress did not intend unreviewed

state administrative proceedings to have preclusive effect on Title VII claims.").
48. Id. at 797 (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1980)). In Allen
v. McCurny, the United States Supreme Court held that collateral estoppel applied
to subsequent lawsuits in federal court based on § 1983. 449 U.S. 90,97-98 (1980).
49. See Elliott, 478 U.S. at 797-98 (citing United States v. Utah Construction &
Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966)). The Elliott Court stated that "[w]e have previously recognized that it is sound policy to apply principles of issue preclusion to
the factfinding of administrative bodies acting in a judicial capacity." Id. at 797-98.
50. Roth v. Koppers Indus., Inc., 993 F.2d 1058, 1059 (3d Cir. 1993) (deciding
that factual findings of Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board were
not entitled to preclusive effect in subsequent lawsuit based on Title VII when state
law requirements of collateral estoppel had not been met); Kelley v. TYK Refractories, Co., 860 F.2d 1188, 1189 (3d Cir. 1988) (deciding that factual findings of
Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board were not entitled to issue
preclusive effect in subsequent lawsuit based on § 1981).
51. Roth, 993 F.2d at 1062 ("Following Elliott, the courts of appeals have unanimously concluded that unreviewed administrative agency decisions findings can
never be accorded preclusive effect in subsequent Title VII proceedings."); Kelley,
860 F.2d at 1193-94 (stating that federal courts must afford agency's decision same
preclusive effect that state court would afford such decision, and that state law of
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Elliott.52
In Kelley v. TYK Refractories, Co.,53 the Third Circuit addressed the issue of whether it would afford preclusive effect in a subsequent lawsuit
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (§ 1981) to findings by the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Review Board (the Board) that the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania had affirmed.M In Keley, the plaintiff
employee filed a claim for state unemployment benefits in Pennsylvania
after he was terminated by his former employer. 55 The Board denied the
employee's claim based on the Board's conclusion that the employee had
voluntarily terminated his employment and had not sustained his burden
of showing cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. 56 The Board
made these findings despite the employee's contention that he was discharged for racial reasons. 5 7 Subsequently, the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania would not have granted preclusive effect to decision of Pennsylvania
Unemployment Compensation Board).
52. The Third Circuit has, however, recognized the Elliott proposition that, in
§ 1983 cases, unreviewed state administrative factfinding is entitled to preclusive
effect in the federal courts. Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d
186, 189 (3d Cir. 1993). In Edmundson, the plaintiff employee filed a lawsuit under
§ 1983 alleging that he was wrongfully discharged from his position as a police
officer because of his adverse comments about the police chief. Id. at 188. The
employee filed his § 1983 suit after an unsuccessful appeal to the Borough Civil
Service Commission of the Borough's decision to discharge him. Id. Although the
employee initially appealed the decision to the Court of Common Pleas, he subsequently withdrew that appeal. Id.
In holding that the unreviewed findings of the Civil Service Commission were
not entitled to preclusive effect, the Third Circuit acknowledged the Court's holding in Elliott. Id. at 192. However, the Third Circuit distinguished the case at bar
from Elliott on the grounds that the Civil Service Commission's findings were, in
essence, legal conclusions rather than findings of fact. Id. Accordingly, the Third
Circuit found Elliott inapposite to the case at bar. Id.
53. 860 F.2d 1188 (3d Cir. 1988).
54. Id. at 1189-92.
55. Id. at 1189-90. The former employee, Kelley, was employed by the defendant, a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese trading company. Id. at 1189.
Kelley contended that he had accepted the position from which he was terminated
based on his former employer's promises that it would give Kelley the authority to
manage the company according to American customs, laws and business practices.
Id. at 1189-90. In addition, Kelley contended that, after he accepted the job, the
president of the defendant company required Kelley to institute Japanese business
practices and violate numerous federal and state laws by discriminating against
older employees. Id. In addition, Kelley alleged that the company insisted that he
engage in unfair labor practices and deprive workers of overtime and vacations.
Id. at 1190. Furthermore, Kelley contended that he was ordered to fire specific
employees and replace them with younger, Japanese males. Id.
56. Id. at 1191. Initially, the Pennsylvania Office of Employment Security denied Kelley's claim for benefits. Id. at 1190. A referee reversed the decision of the
Office of Employment Security and determined that Kelley's termination was involuntary, and accordingly, Kelley was entitled to benefits. Id. The referee made
no findings concerning whether or not the employer discriminated against Kelley.
Id. In response to the referee's decision, the employer appealed the decision to
the Board, which reversed the referee's decision. Id. at 1191.
57. See id. at 1190 ("In count V of his complaint, Kelley contended that TYK
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Pennsylvania affirmed the Board's findings. 5 8 Between the date of the
Board's findings and the Commonwealth Court's affirmation, the employee filed suit under § 1981, alleging that his former employer had violated his civil rights. 59 During litigation under § 1981, the employer
contended that the Board's finding that the employer did not engage in
discriminatory conduct precluded the employee from relitigating the
same issue in federal court.6
In its analysis in Kelley, the Third Circuit found that § 1738 applied
because the Commonwealth Court had affirmed the findings of the Board
and rendered a judgment. 6 1 Section 1738 required the Third Circuit to
give the Board's findings the same preclusive effect in the § 1981 action as
the Pennsylvania courts would give to the Board's findings. 62 Accordingly,
the Third Circuit applied Pennsylvania's common law of collateral estoppel to the facts of the case and determined that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court would not afford the Board's findings collateral estoppel effect because the issues in both lawsuits were not identical. 63 Specifically, the
Third Circuit concluded that the issue of discharge before the Board was
not the same as the issue of discharge presented in the former employee's
§ 1981 claim. 64 Because the former employer had not satisfied the requirements of collateral estoppel under Pennsylvania state law, the Third
Circuit concluded that the former employee could proceed with the
§ 1981 lawsuit in federal court without any adverse effects from the prior
findings of the Board, even though a state court had affirmed the Board's
discharged him and denied the exercise of his stock options because he is a white
American citizen ....

58. Id. at 1192.
59. Id. at 1191. Kelley filed his complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County. Id. However, the defendant sought and obtained removal of
the case to the United States District Court of the Western District of Pennsylvania
based on the § 1981 claim. Id.
60. Id. The employer moved for summary judgment on all counts of Kelley's
complaint on the grounds that Kelley had fully litigated the issue of his discharge
before the Board. Id.
61. See id. at 1193 ("[W]e are concerned here with the issue preclusive effects
of a state administrative agency's determination, affirmed by a state court....
[W]e are therefore required to give the Unemployment Compensation Review
Board's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in the
Pennsylvania courts.").
62. Id. (relying on Kremer v. Chemical Construction Co., 456 U.S. 461
(1982)).
63. Id. at 1193-94. For a discussion of the elements of collateral estoppel
under Pennsylvania state law, see infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
64. Kelley, 860 F.2d at 1194. Despite admitting that the issue of discharge was
central to litigation under both the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation
Law and § 1981, the Third Circuit found that the more precise issue of whether
the discharge was racially motivated was not determined as part of the proceedings
before the Board. Id. at 1195-96. Specifically, the court stated that a finding of
racial discrimination was not central to the Board's assertion that Kelley did not
have a necessitous and compelling cause for a voluntary termination, whereas a
finding of racial discrimination is essential in a § 1981 action. Id. at 1196.
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decision. 65 Therefore, Kelley established that in order for a federal court
in the Third Circuit to afford collateral estoppel effect to findings of the

Board in a subsequent lawsuit under § 1981, a state court must affirm the
Board's findings 66 and the findings must satisfy the state common law re67
quirements of collateral estoppel.
After deciding Kelley, the Third Circuit, in Roth v. Koppers Industry,
Inc.,68 addressed the issue whether to afford issue preclusive effect to unreviewed Board findings in a subsequent lawsuit based on alleged violations
of Title VII. 6 9 In Roth, the plaintiff employee ceased working for the defendant employer after informing the employer that she was discriminated
against and harassed by her co-workers because of her sex. 70 Subsequently, the employee applied for unemployment benefits under Pennsylvania's Unemployment Compensation Law. 7 1 Upon final review of the
employee's claim, the Board concluded that the employee was eligible for
72
benefits because she left work for necessitous and compelling reasons.
In addition, the Board found that the employee's co-workers had indeed
subjected her to discrimination and harassment. 73 The employer chose
not to appeal the Board's decision to the Commonwealth Court of
74
Pennsylvania.
After the Board's decision, the employee filed a complaint in federal
district court alleging violations of Tide VII. 7 5 During litigation of the Ti-

65. Id. at 1198. The court stated that "the issue of whether TYK discharged
Kelley from his employment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is not precluded by
the decision of the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review
and remains open on remand." Id. (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 1193. For a discussion of the necessity of state court review of a state
agency decision as a predicate for issue preclusion in subsequent litigation under
§ 1981, see infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
67. Id. at 1193-94. For a discussion of the necessity of satisfying state law requirements of collateral estoppel as a predicate for issue preclusive effect in subsequent litigation under § 1981, see infra notes 123-28 and accompanying text.
68. 993 F.2d 1058 (3d Cir. 1993).
69. Id. at 1058.
70. Id. at 1059. Shortly after leaving work, the plaintiff-employee, Carol Roth,
discussed the conditions of her employment with the vice-president of the defendant corporation. Id. The vice-president promised to investigate the allegations of
harassment and urged Roth to return to work. Id. When Roth failed to return to
work, the defendant-employer treated her decision as a voluntary resignation. Id.
71. Id. Initially, a representative from the Pennsylvania Office of Employment
Security denied Roth's application for unemployment compensation benefits. Id.
72. Id. Roth appealed the initial determination by the Office of Employment
Security, only to have a referee affirm the finding that Roth had voluntarily resigned her employment. Id. Roth then appealed to the Board, which concluded
that Roth resigned for necessitous and compelling reasons because her only
choices were to resign or to return to work under the current conditions. Id.
73. Id. While the Board determined that Roth was subjected to harassment
and discrimination, "it did not indicate whether the discrimination was based on
sex or some other grounds." Id.
74. Id.

75. Id. at 1059. Roth based her Title VII claim on a hostile work environment
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de VII claim, the employee asserted that a federal court must afford collateral estoppel effect to the Board's findings concerning harassment and
discrimination. 76 Despite the employee's contention, the Third Circuit
held that it would not afford preclusive effect to findings of the Board in a
subsequent action under Title VII when a Pennsylvania court had not re77
viewed those findings.
The Third Circuit analyzed Roth in light of the United States Supreme
Court's decisions in Kremer and Elliott.78 The Third Circuit found Elliott to
be directly on point because both Roth and Elliott involved the unreviewed
findings of a state agency. 79 As a result, the Third Circuit concluded that
theory. Id.; see also Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1482-86 (3d Cir. 1990)
(recognizing cause of action under Title VII based on hostile work environment
theory and setting forth plaintiff's burden of proof). In addition to the Title VII
claim, Roth also alleged violations of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1)
(1988). Roth, 993 F.2d at 1059.
76. Roth, 993 F.2d at 1060. The district court rejected this argument on the
grounds that Roth had not met all of the requirements for collateral estoppel. Id.
Specifically, the district court found that the issue decided by the Board was not
the same issue disputed in the federal district court. Id.
77. Id. at 1063.
78. Id. at 1061-63. The Third Circuit referred to a key footnote in Kremer,
which stated that a "state's preclusion rules would not apply [in a subsequent Title
VII lawsuit] to unreviewed administrative findings by state agencies." Id. at 1061.
The Third Circuit then noted that Elliott gave meaning to this footnote by examining the enforcement scheme of Title VII, which requires that "substantial weight"
be given to findings and orders made by state or local authorities. Id. Elliott also
stated that this "substantial weight" requirement would be meaningless if the findings were entitled to collateral estoppel effect. Id. at 1062. Finally, the Third Circuit noted that, since Elliott, all of the courts of appeals have determined that an
unreviewed administrative agency finding may not receive issue preclusive effect in
a subsequent Title VII lawsuit. Id.
79. See id. at 1061-62 (discussing impact of Supreme Court's decisions in
Kremer and Elliott on case at bar). Roth involved the unreviewed findings of the
Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, which were made
pursuant to Pennsylvania's Unemployment Compensation Law. Id. at 1058. Similarly, Elliott involved the unreviewed findings of an administrative law judge pursuant to proceedings under the Tennessee Uniform Administrative Procedures Act.
University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 790-91 (1986).
In addition, the Third Circuit found no credence in the employee's attempt
to distinguish the facts in Roth from the facts in Elliott on the grounds that Roth
involved the offensive use of collateral estoppel by the employee, whereas Elliott
involved the defensive use of collateral estoppel by the defendant employer. Roth,
993 F.2d at 1062. The Roth court was persuaded by three district courts that have
held that Elliott bars the offensive use of collateral estoppel in a Title VII action by
an employee who had previously filed a successful claim for unemployment compensation benefits. Id. (citing Gallo v. John Powell Chevrolet, Inc., 765 F. Supp.
198, 207-08 (M.D. Pa. 1991), Johnson v. Halls Merchandising, Inc., 49 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 527, 528, 1989 WL 23201, at *2 (W.D. Mo. 1989) and Caras v.
Family First Credit Union, 688 F. Supp. 586, 589 (D. Utah 1988)); see Gallo v.John
Powell Chevrolet, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 198, 207-08 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (discharged salesperson brought action against automobile dealership alleging that she was discharged because of her sex and pregnancy); see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979) (comparing merits of offensive collateral estoppel with
merits of defensive collateral estoppel).
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it would not afford preclusive effect to unreviewed findings of the Board
in a subsequent lawsuit based on Title VII.80
III.

ANALYSIS

Even after Roth and Kelley, the collateral estoppel effect of reviewed
and unreviewed state agency findings in subsequent lawsuits based on alleged violations of federal anti-discrimination statutes is not a settled point
in the Third Circuit. Nevertheless, careful study of the Supreme Court's
analysis in the Kremer and Elliott cases, which underlie the Third Circuit's
rationale in Roth and Kelley, reveals several factors that must be considered
when applying Roth and Kelley to other cases arising in the Third Circuit
that involve the preclusive effect of prior state agency findings in a subsequent lawsuit based on a federal anti-discrimination statute. 81 These factors include: (1) an examination of the level of state court review of the
agency decision; 82 (2) a review of the federal anti-discrimination statute at
issue in the subsequent lawsuit;83 and (3) a determination of whether the
84
state law requirements of collateral estoppel have been satisfied.
A.

The FirstFactor: Has a State Court Rmiewed the Agency Decision?

The first factor to consider when evaluating the preclusive effect of
state agency findings in a subsequent lawsuit under a federal anti-discrimination statute in the Third Circuit is whether a state court has reviewed
the agency's findings. 85 Although the factor of state court review is certainly relevant in determining preclusive effect, Kremer and Elliott demonstrate that the existence or non-existence of state court review of an
agency's decision is not dispositive when assessing the potential preclusive
effect of an agency's decision in a subsequent lawsuit.8 6 The correlation
between the existence or non-existence of state court review of a state
agency decision and the preclusive effect of the agency's decisions, also
80. Roth, 993 F.2d at 1062-63.
81. For a discussion of the factors that are useful in assessing the preclusive
effect of state agency decisions in subsequent lawsuits based on the federal antidiscrimination laws, see infra notes 82-112 and accompanying text.
82. For a full discussion of the need to examine the level of state court review
afforded the agency decision, see infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
83. For a full discussion of the importance of analyzing the federal statute at
issue in the subsequent lawsuit, see infra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
84. For a full discussion of the state law requirements of collateral estoppel,
see infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Co., 456 U.S. 461, 468-85 (1982) (discussing application of § 1738 in cases in which state court has reviewed state
agency's decision); Kelley v. TYK Refractories, Inc., 860 F.2d 1188, 1193 (3d Cir.
1988) (focusing on level of state court review in Kremer and Elliott and related importance of this review to issue preclusion in subsequent lawsuit).
86. See, University of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 795-99 (1986) (emphasizing need to determine if statute involved in subsequent lawsuit is consistent with

federal common law of preclusion); Kremer, 456 U.S. at 470-78 (emphasizing need
to determine whether statute involved in subsequent lawsuit repeals § 1738).
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depends upon the particular federal statute at issue in the subsequent lawsuit.8 7 Therefore, as a practical matter, one must simultaneously consider
both the factors of state court review and the specific federal statute involved in the subsequent lawsuit when determining the preclusive effect of
a state agency decision.
In Kremer and Elliott, the United States Supreme Court established
general rules concerning the preclusive effect of state agency decisions in
two situations: (1) when a state court has reviewed the agency decision;88
and (2) when a state court has not reviewed the agency decision. 89 In
Kremer, the Court stated that, when a state court has reviewed a state
agency's findings, § 1738 requires federal courts to afford the agency's
findings preclusive effect in subsequent proceedings under another statute unless that statute expressly or impliedly repeals § 1738.90 Similarly, in
Elliot4 the Court stated that a federal common law of preclusion should be
applied to unreviewed state agency decisions in the absence of a showing
that Congress intended to repeal such a common law for a particular statute. 9 1 Specifically, the Court in Elliott stated that, in the absence of a showing of contrary congressional intent, a federal court must give unreviewed
state agency findings the same preclusive effect those findings would receive in the state's own courts. 92 Thus, Elliott has meaning only if the
courts of a particular state give preclusive effect to the decisions of their
own state's agencies. If the courts of a particular state do not afford
preclusive effect to the findings of their own state's agencies, then federal
courts have no obligation to give unreviewed agency findings preclusive
effect.
B.

The Second Factor. The Statute Involved in the Lawsuit

The Supreme Court decisions in Kremer and Elliott established that,
regardless of whether a state court has reviewed the decision of the state
agency, the treatment of preclusion by the particular federal anti-discrimination statute at issue in the subsequent lawsuit is crucial for determining
87. See Elliott, 478 U.S. at 796 ("The question actually before us is whether a
common-law rule of preclusion would be consistent with Congress' intent in enacting Title VII.").
88. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 463-64 (determining preclusive effect of state agency
decision, which the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court had
affirmed, in subsequent Title VII litigation).
89. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 790-93 (determining preclusive effect of findings by ALJ
in subsequent § 1983 lawsuit when plaintiff did not seek review of administrative
proceedings in Tennessee courts).
90. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468 (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 99 (1983)).
For a complete discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion in Kremer, see supra
notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
91. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 796. For a complete discussion of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Elliott, see supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
92. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 799.
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the preclusive effect of a state agency decision. 93 If a court has reviewed
the agency decision, the court must analyze the statute at issue in the second lawsuit to determine if the statute repeals § 1738. 94 Similarly, if a
court has not reviewed the agency decision, but state courts grant unreviewed agency decisions preclusive effect, the court must analyze the statute at issue in the subsequent lawsuit to see if application of a federal
common law of preclusion is appropriate. 95 These general propositions,
along with the progeny of Kremer and Elliott, both in the Supreme Court
and in the Third Circuit, provide a framework for predicting the preclusive effect of state agency decisions under federal anti-discrimination stat96
utes that the Court has yet to review.
C.

The FinalFactor: Meeting the State Law Requirements for Collateral
Estoppel When a State Court Has Reviewed the Agency Decision

If the federal statute under which an individual has sued requires a
court to apply either § 1738 or the federal common law of preclusion to a
prior state agency decision, assessing the precise preclusive effect of the
agency's decision requires a determination of whether or not the state
agency's findings satisfy that state's collateral estoppel requirements. 9 7 In
Kelley v. TYK Refractories, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit clearly established that parties also must satisfy state law requirements of collateral estoppel before a federal court can afford a state
93. Id. at 796-97 ("Congress, in enacting the Reconstruction civil rights statutes, did not intend to create an exception to general rules of preclusion.");
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468-76 (discussing, in depth, legislative history of Title VII of
Civil Rights Act of 1964). Kremer established that, in cases of reviewed state agency
decisions, the § 1738 rules of preclusion apply in the subsequent lawsuit unless the
statute at issue in the subsequent lawsuit repeals § 1738. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468
(citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 99 (1980)). Similarly, if the agency decision
has not been reviewed by a state court, but the courts of that state do afford preclusive effect to the findings of the agency, practitioners subsequently litigating under
federal anti-discrimination statutes must be able to determine whether the federal
common law of preclusion from Elliott exists for that particular statute. See Elliott,
478 U.S. at 799 (stating that federal courts must give unreviewed decision of
agency acting in judicial capacity same preclusive effect to which it would be entided in state's own courts).
94. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468 ("Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 99 (1980), made
clear that an exception to § 1738 will not be recognized unless a later statute contains an express or implied partial repeal."). For a discussion of the need to determine congressional intent concerning preclusion in cases of reviewed state agency
decisions, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
95. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 796 ("The question actually before us is whether a common-law rule of preclusion would be consistent with Congress' intent in enacting
Title VII."). For a discussion of the federal common law of preclusion, see supra
notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
96. For a full analysis of the federal anti-discrimination statutes in light of the
framework set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Kremer and Elliot4 see
infra notes 113-46 and accompanying text.
97. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 799 ("[Flederal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in State's own courts.").
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agency decision- preclusive effect.9 8
Pennsylvania state law sets forth the typical requirements for the existence of collateral estoppel: 99 (1) the issue decided in the agency proceeding must be identical to the issue presented in the subsequent action; 100
(2) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted in the federal
lawsuit must have been a party or in privity with a party to the administrative proceeding; 10 1 (3) the issue must have been fully and fairly litigated in
a prior action; 10 2 and (4) the prior action in which the issue was litigated
must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.10 3 Two of these four
elements are particularly susceptible to dispute in the context of the
preclusive effect of state agency decisions: the requirement that the issues
be identical, and the requirement that the parties have fully and fairly
litigated the issue in the state agency proceeding.
1.

The Identical Nature of the Issues

Determining whether issues are identical requires the practitioner to
compare the precise findings of the state agency with the facts that the
party invoking collateral estoppel seeks to establish in the subsequent lawsuit.1 0 4 As an illustrative example, consider an individual who seeks to use
the findings of Pennsylvania's Unemployment Compensation Board to
98. See Kelley, 860 F.2d at 1193 (commenting that district court, although
properly applying Kremer and Elliott, erred by not analyzing Pennsylvania's law of
collateral estoppel in order to determine preclusive effect of state agency's
finding).
99. Id. at 1194 (citing Safeguard Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams, 345 A.2d
664, 668 (Pa. 1975)). The elements of collateral estoppel under Pennsylvania law
are similar to the elements of collateral estoppel in other states. See, e.g., Jones v.
Charles Warner Co., 83 A. 131, 134 (Del. Super. Ct. 1912) ("The rule is ... that a
former judgment on the merits... is conclusive and final as to any issue actually
litigated and determined in the former action, [where the] issue is essential to...
a second action between them, though it be brought upon a different cause of
action."); Taha v. DePalma, 519 A.2d 905, 906 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986)
(stating that collateral estoppel under New Jersey law requires matters to have
been actually litigated and determined in prior action, and also that mattters were
directly in issue between parties).
100. Kelley, 860 F.2d at 1194.
101. Id.
102. Id. A common test for determining whether an agency has actually litigated, and thus decided, an issue, if it is not explicitly mentioned in their decision,
is to determine whether the issue in question was essential to the agency's decision.
See, e.g., J & L Steel Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Jones), 602
A.2d 912, 916 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992) (requiring that issue be essential to judgment before granting preclusive effect in subsequent lawsuit); City of Harrisburg v.
Laukemann, 471 A.2d 132, 133-34 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984) (requiring issue before
court to have been issue actually litigated previously); see also Scott, supra note 14,
at 10-15 (discussing procedure for determining which issues are decided when two
or more issues were raised in the initial lawsuit).
103. Kelley, 860 F.2d at 1194.
104. See REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (1982) (discussing
problem of delineating particular issue on which litigation may or may not be foreclosed by prior judgment); Allan D. Vestal, Predusion/ResJudicataVariables: Nature
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preclude relitigation of the issue of discrimination in a subsequent lawsuit
based on Title VII. If the employee left work voluntarily, the employee
must establish that he left work for cause of a "necessitous and compelling
nature" in order to receive benefits under Pennsylvania's Unemployment
Compensation Law. If the employee contends that discriminatory treatment by his or her employer was the sole cause of his unemployment, the
Board must make a factual finding concerning this allegation to determine the validity of the employee's claim. 10 5 Thus, the Board's determination of the validity of the employee's claim will hinge solely upon the
Board's factual finding concerning the existence or non-existence of discrimination. Likewise, in an employment discrimination lawsuit under Title VII, the employee must establish discriminatory treatment by the
employer. 10 6 Because the issue whether or not the employer engaged in
discriminatory conduct exists in both the state unemployment compensation proceeding and the Title VII proceeding, and because the issue is
essential to the Board's decision, the employee has met the collateral estoppel requirement that the issues be identical.
In contrast to the preceding hypothetical, the Third Circuit, in Kelley,
found that the requirement of identical issues was not satisfied in proceedings before the Board and in a subsequent lawsuit under § 1981.107 The
Third Circuit determined that the Board made no specific finding concerning the presence or absence of race discrimination, but found only
that the applicant for unemployment benefits had no "necessitous and
compelling cause" for voluntarily leaving work. l0 8 Accordingly, the court
concluded that the Board's findings concerning the presence or absence
of discrimination did not have preclusive effect in a subsequent action
under § 1981, which also requires a finding of race discrimination. 10 9 Kelley establishes that the degree of precision of the state agency's findings
often determines whether issues are identical for purposes of collateral
estoppel.

of the Controversy, 1965 WASH. U. L.Q. 158, 160-64 (discussing preciseness of issues
requirement).
105. For a discussion of procedures for determining the validity of claims
under Pennsylvania's Unemployment Compensation Law, see supra notes 18-26
and accompanying text.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988) (describing unlawful employment practices
in context of Tide VII). See generally ANDREW J. RuzIcHo ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION § 1.18 (1989) (discussing criteria for proof of discrimination under Title VII).
107. Kelley, 860 F.2d at 1194. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's decision
in Kelley, see supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
108. Kelley, 860 F.2d at 1195-96. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's find-

ings in Kelley, see supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
109. Kelley, 860 F.2d at 1196-97. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's conclusions in Kelley, see supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
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The Fully and Fairly Litigated Requirement

Pennsylvania's law of collateral estoppel requires that the party opposed to the use of a prior judgment in a subsequent proceeding must
have had an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the issue decided by the
state agency. 11 0 This requirement is also vulnerable to attack by a party
arguing against finding preclusive effect."' While it is impossible to define absolutely the procedures that guarantee, in every instance, a full and
fair opportunity to litigate, at a minimum, the agency proceedings must
not offend the party's right to due process under the United States Constitution. 112 Therefore, if a party wishes to argue that they were denied a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question, they must undertake
a procedural due process analysis.
D. Applying the Factors: Predicting the Preclusive Effect of State Agency
Decisions Under the FederalAnti-DiscriminationStatutes
Upon ascertaining the level of state court review that an agency decision has received and determining that the elements of collateral estoppel
have been satisfied, a party wishing to sue under a federal anti-discrimination statute must next determine whether such statute permits relitigation
of a matter previously decided by a state agency.
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The preclusive effect of state agency decisions in subsequent lawsuits
based on Title VII was settled by the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Kremer and Elliott.' 13 In Kremer, the Court established that in Title
110. See Kelley, 860 F.2d at 1194 (describing Pennsylvania's collateral estoppel
requirement of full and fair litigation).
111. See, e.g., Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d
494, 504-05 (3d Cir. 1979) (requiring full and fair opportunity to litigate as prerequisite for collateral estoppel), vacated on other grounds, 448 U.S. 902 (1980). The
full and fairly litigated requirement does not necessarily require that the issue have

been decided in a trial. See also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OFJUDGMENTs

§ 27 cmt. d

(1982) (requiring only that issue be properly raised, by pleadings or otherwise,
and submitted for determination).
112. SeeKremerv. Chemical Constr., Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 (1982) (stating
that, for purposes of applying § 1738 to reviewed state agency decisions, state proceedings need only "satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and
credit guaranteed by federal law"). See generally 1B JAMEs W. MOORE ET AL.,
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.441[3.-3] (2d ed. 1993) (discussing parameters of
full and fair opportunity to litigate concept); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 (1982) (listing exceptions to general rule of issue preclusion, many of
which implicate concept of full and fair opportunity to litigate).
113. University of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 794-95 (1986) (discussing
preclusive effect of unreviewed state agency decision in subsequent Title VII law-

suit); Kremer, 456 U.S. at 468-85 (discussing preclusive effect of reviewed state
agency decision in subsequent Title VII lawsuit). For a complete discussion of Elliott, see supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text. For a complete discussion of
Kremer, see supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
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VII cases federal courts must always grant preclusive effect to the reviewed
decisions of state agencies. 114 The rationale supporting this rule is that
neither the text nor the legislative history of Title VII shows any intent by
Congress to repeal § 1738.115 Conversely, in Elliott, the Court established
that in Title VII cases a federal court may not grant preclusive effect to
unreviewed decisions of state agencies." 6 The Elliott Court supported this
holding by finding that Title VII's enforcement scheme evidenced Congress' intent not to apply the federal common law of preclusion to state
1 17
agency findings in Title VII cases.
2.

The Americans With DisabilitiesAct

Although no federal court has determined the preclusive effect of the
reviewed or unreviewed state agency decisions in litigation based on the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 118 it is likely that the rules of preclusion under the ADA will mirror those of Title VII. Neither the text nor
the legislative history of the ADA support an argument that Congress intended that the ADA repeal § 1738.19 Accordingly, the ADA survives the
Kremer test and courts should find that reviewed state agency decisions deserve preclusive effect in ADA litigation.
Similar to Title VII, courts should also find that unreviewed state
agency decisions do not deserve preclusive effect in ADA lawsuits. This
conclusion makes sense given that the ADA has adopted the same enforcement scheme as Title VII.' 2 0 Under both enforcement schemes, state
agencies and the EEOC have priority in resolving complaints of discrimination.' 2 1 Furthermore, the ADA states that the EEOC must give substantial weight to the state agency's findings. 122 Importing the Court's logic
from Elliott, one may conclude that Congress would not have included
114. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 485.
115. Id. For a discussion of the Court's rationale in Kremer, see supranotes 2935 and accompanying text.
116. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 796.
117. Id. at 795-96. For a complete discussion of the Court's rationale in Elliott, see supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
118. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V 1993).
119. Id. (failing to mention preclusion); H.R. REP. No. 485(I), 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267 (setting forth legislative history and also failing to mention preclusion).
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (importing enforcement scheme of Tide VII).
121. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1988). In pertinent
part, section 2000e-5(c) reads:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a
State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law
prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing
or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such
practice... no charge may be filed under subsection (b) of this section
by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law ....
Id.
122. Id. § 2000e-5(b) ("In determining whether reasonable cause exists, the
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such a statement in the ADA if-Congress intended for the unreviewed findings of a state agency to have preclusive effect.
3.

Section 1981

The general rules concerning the preclusive effect of state agency
findings, as set forth in Kremer and Elliott apply to lawsuits based on alleged violations of § 1981.123 In Kelley, the Third Circuit granted the state
court-reviewed decision of the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Board the same preclusive effect in federal court to which it was entitled in the Pennsylvania courts on the grounds that § 1738 mandated such
action. 124 The Third Circuit made this decision without applying the
Kremer test for determining whether § 1981 repeals § 1738.125 Instead, the
court recognized that Elliott requires federal courts to grant preclusive effect to unreviewed state agency decisions under any of the Reconstruction
civil rights statutes. 12 6 By virtue of § 1738, reviewed decisions of state
agencies always have a greater "right" to preclusive effect in later lawsuits
than unreviewed decisions. As a result, the court reasoned that reviewed
decisions of state agencies must always have at least the same preclusive
effect in a later lawsuit as unreviewed decisions would have in that lawsuit. 12 7 Moreover, the Kelley court noted that Elliott established that the
federal common law of preclusion applies to unreviewed state agency deci1 28
sions in § 1981 lawsuits.
4.

Section 1983

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Elliottestablished that
a federal common law of preclusion exists for unreviewed state agency
decisions in subsequent litigation under § 1983.129 The Court has also
Commission shall accord substantial weight to final findings and orders made by
State or local authorities ....").
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
124. Kelley v. TIK Refractories, Inc., 860 F.2d 1188, 1193 (3d Cir. 1988). For
a complete discussion of the Third Circuit's opinion in Kelley, see supra notes 53-67
and accompanying text.
125. See Kelley, 860 F.2d at 1193-94 (deciding case on ground that state requirements of collateral estoppel were not satisfied for issue in question).
126. Id. at 1193 (citing University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796-97
(1986)).
127. See id. (beginning with premise that unreviewed state agency decisions
have preclusive effect in later lawsuits, and accordingly, so must reviewed state
agency decisions).
128. Id. (citing University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796-97
(1986)).
129. But cf.Edmundson v. Borough of Kennett Square, 4 F.3d 186, 189-93 (3d
Cir. 1993) (declining to afford preclusive effect to unreviewed agency decision in
subsequent § 1983 lawsuit on grounds that Elliott applies only to factfinding of administrative agency acting in judicial capacity and not to conclusions on legal issues); Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, 829 F.2d 1056, 1064-65 & n.21 (11th Cir.
1987) (stating that Elliott applies in context of issue preclusion, but not claim preclusion); Peery v. Brakke, 826 F.2d 740, 746 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that Elliott
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held that in § 1983 cases federal courts must afford preclusive effect to
judgments issued by state courts.1 30 The Court stated that both the text
and legislative history of § 1983 clearly support the compatibility of § 1983
and the rules of preclusion.1 3 1 Accordingly, § 1983 passes muster under
the Kremer analysis and supports the conclusion that § 1983 does not repeal § 1738.
5.

The Age Discriminationin Employment Act

Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit has determined whether reviewed state
agency findings have preclusive effect in lawsuits based on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).132 Nevertheless, because no evidence exists that Congress intended for the ADEA to repeal § 1738,
reviewed state agency decisions should have preclusive effect in ADEA lawsuits.'l 3 Also, the Supreme Court, in Astoria Federal Savings & Loan v.
grants preclusive effect to findings of fact but not conclusions of law). For a discussion of the Elliott decision, see supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
130. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-05 (1980). In Allen, the plaintiff, McCurry, was convicted of possessing heroin and assault with intent to kill in connection with a drug bust at his house. Id. at 92. McCurry filed a lawsuit under § 1983
against several police officers involved in the drug bust alleging a conspiracy to
violate McCurry's Fourth Amendment rights, assault and an unconstitutional
search and seizure of his house. Id. The police officers moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the state courts had already decided the issue of the
legality of the search and seizure in a pretrial suppression hearing in connection
with McCurry's criminal trial, and thus, collateral estoppel prevented McCurry
from relitigating this question. Id. at 92-93. The United States Supreme Court
found in favor of the police officers, holding that nothing in the text or legislative
history of § 1983 prevented the police officers from invoking the doctrine of collateral estoppel in connection with the question of the legality of the search and
seizure. Id. at 103-05.
131. Id. at 97. The Court found that "nothing in the language of § 1983 remotely expresses any Congressional intent to contravene the common-law rules of
preclusion or to repeal the express statutory requirements of the predecessor of
[§ 1738]." Id. at 97-98. In fact, § 1983 is silent on the subject of the preclusive
effect of state courtjudgments. Id. at 98. The Court also examined the legislative
history of § 1983, noting that the statute's purpose was to suppress the "influence
of the Ku Klux Klan and its sympathizers on the governments and law enforcement
agencies of the Southern States." Id. Accordingly, the legislative history of § 1983
does not show any intent by Congress to repeal the traditional doctrines of preclusion. Id. at 98-99.
132. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988). In relevant part, the ADEA states that "[i]t
shall be unlawful for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual or ptherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age." Id.
133. See Nichols v. City of St. Louis, 837 F.2d 833, 836 (8th Cir. 1988) (granting issue preclusive effect to state court judgments in ADEA case). In reaching its
decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit did not employ
a Kremer-type analysis to determine if the text and legislative history of the ADEA
indicated a congressional intent to repeal § 1738. Id. at 835. Nevertheless, the
Eighth Circuit still reached the conclusion that issue preclusion barred an em-
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Solimino,i3 4 has suggested that it would afford reviewed agency decisions
preclusive effect in ADEA lawsuits because of the closely parallel language
of the ADEA and Title VII. 135 In Astoria, the Supreme Court determined
that the federal common law of preclusion does not apply to state agency
decisions in ADEA lawsuits.' 3 6 The Court made this determination after
engaging in an Elliott-type analysis of the enforcement provisions of the
ADEA.13 7 Specifically, the Court found these provisions nearly identical
to those in Title VII. 13 8 The ADEA's enforcement scheme, like that of
Title VII, clearly contemplates the possibility of federal consideration of
complaints after the appropriate state agency has completed proceedings
under state law.' 3 9 Accordingly, despite the absence of an express statement from Congress in the ADEA's text or legislative history, the Court
found the enforcement scheme 'of the ADEA sufficiently similar to that of
Title VII to warrant an exception to the presumption of a federal common
140
law of preclusion.
6.

The Equal Pay Act

Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit has defined the preclusive effect of either
reviewed or unreviewed state agency decisions in lawsuits under the Equal
ployee's age discrimination action against a city hospital. Id. at 836. Procedurally,
the Civil Service Commission (the Commission) first determined that the hospital
discharged the employee for good cause. Id. at 834. Subsequently, the St. Louis

Circuit Court, a Missouri state court, affirmed the Commission's decision. Id. The
Eighth Circuit granted the Commission's findings preclusive effect in the ADEA
action, relying on the fact that a state court had reviewed the Commission's decision and the fact that the employee "had been given a full and fair opportunity to
litigate that issue before the Commission and the state circuit court." Id. at 835.
134. 501 U.S. 104 (1991).

135. See id. at 109 (noting that Court has found state court judgments, in
closely parallel context of Title VII, to enjoy preclusive effect in federal courts).

136. Id. at 110-111. In Astoria, a former employee, Solimino, filed a charge
with the EEOC alleging that his former employer had dismissed him in violation of
the ADEA. Id. at 106. The EEOC referred the claim to a state agency, which
found no probable cause to believe that the defendant employer terminated
Solimino because of his age. Id. Solimino did not appeal the agency's decision to
state court, but instead, proceeded with his ADEA lawsuit in federal court. Id. at
106-107.
137. Id. at 110-111.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 111. Like Tide VII, the enforcement provisions of the ADEA also
permit the EEOC to investigate claims of discrimination after termination of proceedings under state law. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2) (1988). In addition, the Court
did not find it significant that the ADEA lacks the "substantial weight" requirement
of Tide VII, stating that this language was not dispositive in the Kremer opinion.
Astoria, 501 U.S. at 112. Moreover, the Court stated that the reason this provision

was absent from the ADEA was because Congress was satisfied that the EEOC was
extending the appropriate level of deference to the findings of state agencies. Id.
140. Astoria, 501 U.S. at 110-11.
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Pay Act (EPA). 141 Nevertheless, applying the Kremer test to the EPA would
result in the conclusion that reviewed state agency decisions should have
preclusive effect in EPA lawsuits. 142 A review of the text and legislative
history of the EPA reveals no congressional intent to have the EPA repeal
§ 1738.143 In addition, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which the
EPA amended, contains no evidence of an intent by Congress to have the
FLSA repeal § 1738.14
Moreover, application of the Elliott test also indicates that the federal
common law of preclusion should apply to the EPA. Because neither the
legislative history nor the text of the EPA makes any mention of whether
the federal common law of preclusion applies, Elliott requires a review of
the enforcement provisions of the EPA.' 45 The EPA does not require that
individuals first file complaints of discrimination with a federal agency
before filing a lawsuit.1'4 Accordingly, the EPA bears a greater resemblance to the Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes than to Tide VII. Using the rationale of the Elliott Court, as applied to §§ 1981 and 1983, a
federal common law of preclusion should apply to unreviewed state
agency decisions in EPA lawsuits.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court, when adopting the current approach in Kremer and Elliott, clearly remained faithful to the policies underlying the concept of full faith and credit in assessing the preclusive
effect of state agency determinations in subsequent lawsuits based on federal anti-discrimination statutes. 147 In addition, the Court's decisions pro141. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).
142. Cf. Kendall v. Avon Prods., Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1178, 1182-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (holding that findings of state agency have preclusive effect in lawsuit based
upon alleged violations of EPA, although not employing Kremer analysis).
143. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (EPA statute prohibiting discriminatory wage policies); H.R. REP. No. 309, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprinted in 1963
U.S.C.CA.N. 687-92 (providing legislative history of EPA).
144. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988) (setting forth relevant operative provisions of EPA but not mentioning preclusion).
145. See University of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 795-97 (1986) (reviewing
enforcement provisions of Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also 29 C.F.R.

§ 1620 et seq. (1992) (providing enforcement provisions for EPA).
146. See EEOC v. Hernando Bank, Inc., 724 F.2d 1188, 1194 (5th Cir. 1984)
(holding that EPA does not require complainant to petition EEOC for relief as
p recondition for filing lawsuit to enforce EPA); accord EEOC v. Home of Economy,
Inc., 712 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1983) ("[W] e hold that, unlike Title VII claims,
there is no requirement that the EEOC conciliate EPA claims before filing suit.");
Ososky v. Wick, 704 F.2d 1264, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[T]he EPA, unlike Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, provides for immediate judicial review of claims for
equal pay.").
147. In Allen v. McCurry, the Supreme Court summarized the policies underly-

ing res judicata and collateral estoppel, stating that "res judicata and collateral
estoppel relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on
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vide a workable framework for determining the preclusive effect of state
agency findings in subsequent lawsuits based on federal anti-discrimina148
tion statutes.
Nevertheless, some courts have ignored the subtleties of the Kremer
and Elliott opinions when assessing the preclusive effect of state agency
decisions.1 49 In particular, these courts have tended to view the factor of
state court review as dispositive, while ignoring the language and legisla150
tive history of the particular statute at issue in the subsequent lawsuit.
Thus far, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
remained loyal to the framework set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Kremer and Elliott. The Third Circuit in Roth has properly assessed
the preclusive effect of an agency's decision in light of: (1) the level of
state court review that the decision has received; (2) the particular federal
statute under which the subsequent lawsuit was based; and (3) whether or
not the state law requirements of collateral estoppel have been satisfied
for the issue in question.
As Congress and state legislatures continue to enact laws that create
administrative agencies with quasi-judicial authority, the finer points of
Krmer and Elliott will become increasingly important. A practitioner must
be capable of supporting arguments of congressional intent, through reliance on either legislative history or the Elliott enforcement provision rationale, to succeed when there is a question concerning the preclusive
effect of a state agency's findings in subsequent litigation under a federal
anti-discrimination statute.
Michaelj Maranshy
adjudication." 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S.
147, 153-54 (1979)). Nevertheless, some commentators argue that the Supreme
Court, in its effort to remain faithful to the policies underlying full faith and
credit, has sacrificed the goals of the civil rights statutes. See Silver, supranote 4, at
369. Professor Silver goes as far as to argue that, "in the absence of exceptional
circumstances, courts should refuse to give preclusive effect to agency determinations in subsequent litigation of claims arising under any federal civil rights statute,
regardless of whether state courts would do so." Id.
148. For a discussion of the framework provided by the Supreme Court for
assessing the preclusive effect of state agency decisions in subsequent litigation
under the federal anti-discrimination statutes, see supra notes 27-49 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Nichols v. City of St. Louis, 837 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1988) (granting state agency decision preclusive effect in subsequent lawsuit under ADEA);
Kendall v. Avon Prods., Inc., 771 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (not using Kremer
analysis in granting state agency decision preclusive effect in subsequent lawsuit
under EPA).
150. For a discussion of particular cases in which courts have based their decisions concerning preclusive effect solely on the factor of state court review, see
supra note 149.
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